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Videotaping Children's Testimony: An Empirical View* 
Increases in the number of reported incidents of child abuse and 
sexual molestation 1 have resulted in more and younger children be-
coming courtroom participants. Some courts refuse to consider the 
special needs of the child in this adversarial environment. Relying on 
questionable precedent, these courts hold that the defendant's right to 
directly confront the child, as well as strict compliance with eviden-
tiary rules, overrides that child's interest in freedom from embarrass-
ment or psychological trauma.2 This Note focuses on pressures felt by 
the testifying child and the ways in which these pressures affect her 
testimony; it then proposes using videotaped testimony as a means of 
overcoming such pressures. 
Part I reviews the psychological research undertaken in conjunc-
tion with this Note and concludes that, as compared to a courtroom 
setting, the quality and reliability of children's testimony is signifi-
cantly enhanced in a smaller, more intimate videotape environment. 
Based in part on such :findings, this Note argues that using videotape 
technology to capture and portray in court the child witness' testi-
mony serves both to lessen emotional trauma to the child and to main-
tain a fair trial for the defendant. 3 Part I concludes by calling for 
regular use of videotapes to present children's testimony. 
Part II focuses on the defendant's sixth amendment right to con-
* This material is based upon work supported under a National Science Foundation 
Fellowship. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this 
publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National 
Science Foundation. A copy of the complete study is on file with the Michigan Law Review. 
1. See, e.g., Collins, Studies Find Sexual Abuse of Children is Widespread, N.Y. Times, May 
13, 1982, at Cl, col. 1 (an American Humane Association study found a 200% increase in re-
ported sexual offenses against children since 1976). Normally, the child is the only witness to 
such abuse and her testimony is the most valuable evidence a prosecutor can offer. See Berliner 
& Stevens, Advocating for Sexually Abused Children in the Criminal Justice System, in SEXUAL 
ABUSE OF CHILDREN: SELECTED READINGS 47, 49 (Natl. Center on Child Abuse & Neglect, 
U.S. Dept. Health & Hum. Services 1980). The dimensions of the child abuse problem are truly 
staggering; according to one report, one in five girls and one in eleven boys are victims of sexual 
assault. D. FINKELHOR, SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED CHILDREN 53 (1979). Most often, a relative or 
an acquaintance of the child is the offender. MacFarlane, Sexual Abuse of Children, in THE 
VICTIMIZATION OF WOMEN 81, 86 (1978). 
2. See, e.g .. Ketcham v. State, 240 Ind. 107, 113, 162 N.E.2d 247, 249-50 (1959) (quoting 
Riggs v. State, 235 Ind. 499, 135 N.E.2d 247, 249 (1956): 
[T]he delicacies of the situation should not be permitted to outweigh the fact that a man's 
liberty and reputable life is at stake. The consequential embarrassment is a small price to 
pay in return for a showing of the witness' understanding of the details upon which such 
conclusion may be properly or improperly based. 
3. While this Note is primarily concerned with the use of videotape to present a child's testi-
mony, other measures might be used to lessen trauma and further reliability with or without 
videotapes. At a minimum, a support person should be available to help the child through the 
legal system. The stressful surroundings and large number of unfamiliar people encountered in 
the legal system can be overwhelming to a child. This unfamiliarity can reduce her ability to 
809 
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frontation as developed by the United States Supreme Court, other 
federal appellate courts, and state courts.4 An analysis of these deci-
sions reveals that the right to face one's accuser is far from absolute: 
the confrontation clause is peppered with exceptions based on policies 
which embrace the use of videotaped testimony in child sexual abuse 
cases. This Note concludes that when properly introduced, a child's 
videotaped testimony will not infringe on the defendant's right to 
confrontation. 
I. THE NEED FOR VIDEOTAPING 
Children in medieval societies were perceived as diminutive adults 
and were expected to function like adults.5 Today, psychological re-
search has demonstrated that children's learning capacities develop in 
a very complex manner over time, and our society no longer expects a 
child to behave like an adult. 6 However, as a witness to or a victim of 
abuse, a child is cast into a system created for adults which is ill-
designed to accommodate her needs. The criminal justice system is 
not only indifferent to a child victim-witness' needs, it actually dis-
trusts the children's abilities to relate an incident, "and puts special 
barriers in their path of prosecuting their claims to justice."7 
testify accurately and may even cause psychological harm. Providing the child witness with an 
emotionally supportive person may alleviate these problems. 
A support person does not have to be a lawyer or an expert in child psychology. Anyone who 
makes the child more comfortable - a parent, aunt or uncle, teacher, social worker, or foster 
parent - can lend this support. This person can sit with the child witness while she testifies in 
the videotape room or in the courtroom. 
Another measure that would aid child witnesses in giving testimony is the use of anatomically 
correct dolls. Since children often lack the appropriate adult sexual terminology to explain what 
happened to them, skillful use of these dolls enables children to communicate exactly what physi· 
cal contact the alleged offenders had with them. 
Anatomically correct dolls are generally acceptable demonstrative evidence in child abuse 
cases. See, e.g., Alexander v. State, 692 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1985). A nonverbal or inarticulate 
child is often better able to explain a traumatic event if given the dolls and asked to use them to 
tell the court what happened. These dolls might be successfully used during out-of-court video· 
taping sessions as well. The child could use the dolls while a skilled interviewer posed questions 
using the dolls as references. In court or out, this process can help the child more accurately 
communicate her story. 
4. The defendant's sixth amendment right to be confronted by his accusers has been held 
applicable to the states via the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Pointer v. 
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
5. See P. ARIEs, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD 128 (1960). 
6. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD 3 (1979). 
7. THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICI1MS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 51 (1982) (Testi-
mony by David Lloyd, attorney for the Child Protection Unit, Children's Hospital National 
Medical Center, Washington, D.C.). Some commentators argue that this distrust of children's 
testimony is well-founded, not because of intentional falsehoods created by the children, but 
because of subtle and not so subtle pressure by social workers interviewing the children. See, e.g., 
Slicker, Child Sex Abuse: The Innocent Accused, 91 CASE & COM. 12 (1986). Because child 
witnesses are especially susceptible to persuasion, great care must be taken to avoid leading them. 
The proposals offered in this Note present one effort to control such subtle pressure. 
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Defense counsel working to block the admission of a child's testi-
mony can presently rely on structural and attitudinal barriers to intro-
ducing the testimony. Often the child's physical, cognitive, and 
emotional immaturity serve to make her courtroom testimony appear 
unreliable. However, recent psychological reports indicate that chil-
dren can perform certain memory tasks as well as older witnesses. 8 
When a child is asked a specific question, such as "What did you have 
for lunch at school today?," the accuracy and completeness of the an-
swer is usually equivalent to that of an adult.9 Researchers have also 
demonstrated that there is little difference in short- or long-term mem-
ory retention between school age children and adults. 10 Although the 
child witness can recall information stored in her memory as well as 
adult witnesses, her method of retrieving that information differs from 
adults and is hindered by the environment created by the adversarial 
system. 11 
A. Children's Needs Can Affect Testimonial Abilities 
1. Information Processing: A Background 
A generally accepted theory of cognitive functioning analogizes the 
8. See, e.g., Dent & Stephenson, An Experimental Study of the Effectiveness of Different 
Techniques of Questioning Child Witnesses, 18 BRIT. J. Soc. & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 41 
(1979). Dent and Stephenson conducted two studies in order to examine the effects upon accu-
racy of recall of different techniques used to obtain evidence from children about a previously 
witnessed incident. In both experiments the children were shown a film of a theft. In the first 
study, one-third of the children were asked to report freely what they could remember about the 
incident ("free report"), another third were asked general questions about the film, and the re-
maining third were asked specific questions. Free report produced the most accurate, but least 
complete responses. The second study focused on the effects of delay before free recall. Delays 
of two weeks and two months before the recall session had no effect on the accuracy compared to 
no delay, though the completeness diminished substantially. 
See also Marin, Holmes, Guth & Kovac, The Potential of Children as Eyewitnesses, 3 L. & 
HUM. BEHAV. 295 (1979). Marin and her colleagues staged live interaction between the experi-
menter and a confederate that was witnessed by subjects between the ages offive and twenty-two. 
The young children gave free reports that were less complete than those of adults. However 
there were no age differences in ability to answer objective questions, in ability to identify the 
confederate from a set of photographs, or in susceptibility to leading questions. In another study, 
fifth graders and college students were shown a videotape of a shoplifting incident. Recall (free 
report) and recognition (answering questions) were then tested. The children's recall was less 
accurate and less complete than that of the adults. Children gave recognition reports that were 
as complete as those of adults, but were less accurate. J. List, Age and Schematic Differences in 
tlte Reliability of Eyewitness Testimony, 22 DEV. PSYCHOLOGY 50, 55 (1986). See also Goodman 
& Hegleson, Child Sexual Assault: Children's Memory and the Law, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 181, 
185 (1985). 
9. Goodman & Michelli, Would You Believe A Child Witness?, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Nov. 
1981, at 82. See also Marin, Holmes, Guth & Kovac, supra note 8, at 301. See generally, Davis, 
Stevenson-Robb & Flin, Tlte Reliability of Children's Testimony, 11 INTL. LEGAL PRAC. 95, 99 
(1986). 
10. Johnson & Foley, Differentiating Fact from Fantasy: The Reliability of Children's Mem-
ory, 40 J. Soc. ISSUES 33, 50 (1984). 
11. D. WHITCOMB, E. SHAPIRO & L. STELLWAGEN, WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD: IS-
SUES FOR JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS 17-19 (Issues and Practice in Criminal Justice, Natl. Inst. 
of Just., U.S. Dept. of Just., Aug. 1985). 
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human mind to a computer; sensory data enter the human mind and 
are cognitively processed. However, as the human system matures, a 
greater amount of processing is possible. This perspective has become 
known as the "information processing" viewpoint.12 
The maturing child's increased capacity to process incoming data, 
complemented by familiarity with a given situation, enables processing 
to occur faster. An increase in age generally is accompanied by an 
increase in experience, and therefore in familiarity. 13 In our litigious 
society, adults are more likely to be familiar with courtroom practices 
and various kinds of crimes than are children.14 The adults' familiar-
ity with the system may permit them to process information concern-
ing crimes and legal proceedings more quickly than children. If a 
court is not willing to allow the extra time that the child needs to 
become familiar with its procedures, poor testimony can result. 
Another cognitive difference between adults and children centers 
on the ability to focus on a particular task. Some psychologists pro-
pose that children under twelve require more mental energy to concen-
trate on a particular task. 15 Thus, children either focus their attention 
on the particular task at hand, almost completely excluding everything 
else around them, or they allow their attention to wander, noting 
many details without deeply processing any of them. The latter view 
is an example of "incidental learning," which occurs when a child ac-
quires information and gives responses irrelevant to the central task, as 
defined by the experimenter.16 
There are two opposing views concerning the effect of incidental 
12. Siegler, Information Processing Approaches to Cognitive Development, in 1 HANDBOOK OP 
CHILD PSYCHOLOGY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND METHODS 129 (P. Mussen ed. 1983). In one 
"information processing" model, memory is conceived of as having a certain number of slots 
which hold chunks of information, and the number of slots is thought to increase with age, at 
least between the ages of five and ten years. Pascual-Leone, A Mathematica/ Mode/for the Tran· 
sition Rule in Piaget's Developmental Stages, 32 ACTA PsYCHOLOGICA 301 (1970). As opposed 
to this structural change, other investigators believe that functional processing capacity increases 
with age. J. FLAVELL, COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 76 (1985). 
13. See J. FLAVELL, supra note 12, at 299. As the parameters of the task become automa· 
tized, more concepts can be attended to or held in working memory at a given time. 
14. Anecdotal evidence supports the view that children have unrealistic expectations con· 
ceming legal trials. Children often feel that they, the witnesses, are on trial. As one fourteen· 
year-old said, "I thought the judge was gonna scream at me." Wiig, Toward a Focus 011 Children 
in the Court Process, in PROTECTING CHILDREN THROUGH THE LEGAL SYSTEM 941 (Natl. 
Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy & Protection, American Bar Assn. 1981). 
15. See Manis, Keating & Morrison, Developmental Differences in the A/location of Process· 
ing Capacity, 29 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 156, 164 (1980). 
16. The capacity demands required in attaining and retaining alertness decrease to adult 
levels between second and sixth grade. There are two types of experiments designed to measure 
incidental learning. In the first, children are exposed to stimuli without being told to learn them 
prior to beginning the task, and are then tested to see what is retained in memory. In the second 
situation, children are told to focus on particular stimuli, and are then tested on those aspects of 
the task to which they were not told to attend. On the basis of several studies, investigators have 
suggested that incidental learning increases through early childhood, peaks around twelve years 
of age and then decreases. See H. STEVENSON, CHILDREN'S LEARNING 210 (1972). 
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learning on witnessing an event and later testimony. One view, held 
by the authors of this Note, proposes that noticing normally "insignifi-
cant" details may be helpful in some cases, such as observing a shop-
lifting in which the criminal is trying to be unobtrusive. Adults may 
not notice the shoplifter because there is no reason to focus on him. 
Children are more likely to notice, although they may not recognize 
the significance of what they see. Children may also observe details of 
a criminal's appearance, while adults concentrate on the behavior of 
the offender. 
The opposing view is that young children focus on details to such 
an extent that they are not able to integrate information as well as 
older children and adults.17 However, this developmental difference 
may actually lead to more accurate testimony. If children are able to 
remember several details without inferring either valid or invalid rela-
tionships, a "true" story should emerge. In contrast, adults may make 
inferences based on their "scripts" for what usually happens in a par-
ticular kind of situation, and in their testimony they may unintention-
ally fill in gaps. 18 
The mere fact that children do not process information the same 
way as adults does not necessarily imply that children are not compe-
tent to testify. Rather, it suggests that children who testify should be 
treated differently than adults. 
2. Information Processing in the Courtroom 
The authors of this Note conducted an empirical investigation to 
test the hypothesis that children's recall, or their willingness to report 
recall, differs with setting. The authors hypothesized that if children 
17. Paris & Lindauer, The Role of Inference in Children's Comprehension of Memory for 
Sentences, 8 CoGNmVE PSYCHOLOGY 217, 225 (1976). In the Paris and Lindauer study, chil-
dren were read a story, and then asked to identify whether certain statements relating to the story 
were true. For example, part of the story might have stated: "The box was under the chair. The 
chair was under the tree." Then an explicit prompt was presented: " 'The box was under the 
chair.' True or false?" An implicit prompt would be, " 'The box was under the tree.' True or 
false?" First and third graders were able to use only explicit prompts to remember sentences, 
whereas fifth graders also made use of implicit prompts, spontaneously inferring relations be-
tween prompts and sentences. 
Studying children of the same ages as those in the Paris and Lindauer study, other investiga-
tors have also concluded that there is a developmental increase in integrative processing. 
Duncan, Whitney & Kunen, Integration of Visual and Verbal Information in Children's Memo-
ries, 53 CHILD DEV. 1215 (1982). 
18. As .a hypothetical example, assume an adult and a child both see a man carrying an 
empty plastic bag enter a department store. Twenty minutes later, they see the man leave the 
store with a full bag. Later the adult and the child discover that the store has been robbed, and 
the adult claims that the man with the bag is the criminal. Upon being questioned, the adult may 
"recall" that the suspect looked around before entering the store, carried a gun, ran when he left 
the store, etc. All of these details fit a script for a robbery, but they did not occur in this case. 
On the basis of what the adult saw, she infers that the man with the bag is the thief, and inte-
grates information from her "burglary script" with what she saw. The child would be unlikely to 
make these inferences. Instead, she would probably report only what she had witnessed. 
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were questioned in a small setting by only one unfamiliar person, they 
could recount a greater amount of accurate information that they had 
witnessed on a videotape than if they were questioned in a typical 
courtroom setting.19 The children watched a simulated father-daugh-
ter confrontation on videotape. Their ability to recall was then tested 
in one of two settings. One-half of the children testified in a small 
room that contained two one-way mirrors and a microphone sus-
pended from the ceiling. This setting accurately reflects how video-
taped testimony might be taken in an actual child sexual abuse case. 
The authors tested the recall of the remaining children either at a 
county courthouse or in the University of Michigan Law School moot 
courtroom. 20 The study tested free recall, with separate scores for 
central items, irrelevant details, and inaccuracies. After the free recall, 
children were asked specific questions concerning details of the video-
tape. Answers to these questions were scored as "correct," "incor-
rect," and "do not know." 
The results of those analyses, which either indicated a trend to-
19. The subjects were seventeen girls and twenty boys between the ages of seven and nine. 
They were from predominantly middle-class families living in southeastern Michigan. 
The study involved two sessions, one on each of two consecutive evenings for each child. 
Throughout both sessions, parents were allowed to accompany their children. The entire first 
session was conducted by three female experimenters. The first session began with a short pencil 
and paper game intended to help the child feel comfortable. Then the children watched a ten-
minute videotape. The first and the last segments were scenes from educational television pro-
grams. The second segment, which was filmed solely for the purpose of this study, centered 
around the conversation of an ill-tempered man and a young girl who had just come home from 
school. After watching the videotape, the children were told that they would meet someone else 
the next day who had not seen the videotape, and that he would ask them questions about one of 
the scenes. Half of the subjects were told that they would be asked questions in a courtroom. 
The subjects were cautioned not to talk to anyone about the videotape until the next evening. 
They were also told that they could do anything they wished to tcy to help them remember what 
happened on the videotape. 
20. In the second session, which was held one day after the first session, half of the children 
went to one of two courtrooms (the Washtenaw County Courthouse or the moot courtroom at 
the Michigan Law School). The other children went to a private room in a different building 
from that in which they met for the first session. The session began with pencil and paper games. 
After the games were completed, the children scheduled to go to the private room were told that 
they would be taken to another room where someone would ask them questions about the second 
scene of the videotape. In the courtroom setting, children were told what a witness is, and that 
they were to be witnesses in the courtroom. Then the children were taken into the room, while 
the initial experimenter waited outside. 
In the private setting, a male interviewer questioned the children and recorded the answers on 
a cassette tape recorder. In the courtroom the ·~udge" ascertained that the children knew the 
difference between the truth and a lie, and asked what happened when people lie. The children 
were then asked if they would answer the questions as best as they could remember about the 
videotape. In an actual trial, this method is often used to secure a modified oath from children. 
Two "attorneys" conducted the questioning. The first attorney asked a few general recall ques-
tions about what happened in the second scene. In addition, he asked the child witness if the 
man on the videotape was in the courtroom, and if so to point to him. (He was located at the 
defendant's table.) The second attorney then cross-examined the child using specific questions. 
With the exception of the identification of the man on the videotape, these two sets of questions 
were the same as those asked by the interviewer in the small room. The judge used a cassette 
tape recorder to record the children's answers. The interviewer, judge, and attorneys were male 
undergraduate research assistants and law school students. 
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ward, or actually attained statistical significance, indicated that, com-
pared to children in a courtroom, children in a small room tend to (1) 
relate more central items in free recall;21 (2) answer specific questions 
correctly more often;22 and (3) say "I don't know" or give no answer 
when asked specific questions significantly less often.23 A possible ex-
21. Free Recall: The first question asked for a general description of what happened during 
the second scene of the videotape. No sex differences were found in any of the scores. There were 
thirteen central items in the second scene of the videotape, each assigned one point. In the small 
room, the central scores ranged from 0 to IO, with a mean of 4.67. Scores of subjects in the 
courtroom ranged from 0 to 7, with a mean of 3.36. While not significant in a one-way analysis 
of variance, there was a tendency for subjects in the small room to relate more central items in 
free recall than subjects in the courtroom (p < .087) (In social science research it is generally 
assumed that the means of two or more conditions are different if the probability of such an 
occurrence by chance is less than or equal to five percent. The notation p < .087 indicates that 
the likelihood that the central mean scores in the courtroom and in the small room are the result 
of chance is 8.7%.). 
Scores for accurate details irrelevant to the story line also consisted of assigning one point per 
item. The scores of subjects in the small room ranged from 1 to 31 with a mean of 5.94. In the 
courtroom condition, scores ranged from 0 to 17, with a mean of 4.90. An analysis of variance 
revealed no significant differences (p < .563) in irrelevant details. 
Due to their rarity, inaccurate responses were not analyzed. Five boys in the courtroom 
supplied a total of seven incorrect responses. The combined score of the three girls in the court-
room who included inaccurate information was five. Five boys and six girls in the small room 
rendered totals of nine inaccurate responses for each sex. 
22. Specific Questions: 
Twenty-six of the twenty-seven specific questions were scored: "correct," "incorrect," and 
"do not know." (One question was deleted from the analyses because it did not have a single 
clear answer.) These categories were not mutually exclusive; an answer to a specific question 
might contain correct and incorrect elements. For example, in response to question 33 ("How 
did the man cut his finger?"}, one subject said, "He was cutting an apple, and he missed, and he 
cut his thumb." This answer would receive two points for being partially correct (the man was 
cutting something; he missed), and also a point for being incorrect (the object was an orange 
rather than an apple). 
For the "correct" score, each question was assigned points reflecting the complexity of the 
possible response. The highest possible "correct" score was 41. The scores were converted to 
percentages (actual score divided by the weighted points of questions actually asked) because, on 
occasion, a question was inadvertently omitted by the questioners. In a two-way analysis of 
variance, no sex differences were revealed. Scores of subjects in the small room ranged from 38% 
to 84%, with a mean of 54.7%. In the courtroom condition, scores ranged from 37% to 59%, 
with a mean of 48.9%. Although this difference was not statistically significant, there was a 
tendency for subjects in the small room to answer more questions correctly than subjects in the 
courtroom (p <.094). 
The "incorrect" scores indicated the number of specific questions to which some inaccurate 
account was given, regardless of the assigned weight of the questions. For the same reason de-
scribed above, the scores were converted to percentages (actual score divided by the number of 
questions asked). Scores ranged from 8% to 46% in the small room condition, with a mean of 
22.2%. In the courtroom condition, the range of scores was from 8% to 42%, with a mean of 
21.6%. Neither sex nor condition was found to be significant in a two-way analysis of variance. 
23. The final index, "do not know," reflected the number of questions to which the subject 
replied "I don't know," or gave no answer. These scores were also converted to percentages. 
The scores for boys in the small room ranged from 0 to 27%, with a mean of 10.4%; for girls the 
range was from 0 to 28%, and the mean was 14.3%. In the courtroom, boys' scores ranged from 
4% to 28%, with a mean of 16%; girls' scores ranged from 0 to 61%, and the mean was 27.5%. 
A two-way analysis of variance revealed that the effect of the setting was significant (p < .02), 
with subjects in the courtroom saying "I don't know" or giving no answer more often. The effect 
of sex approached significance (p < .056), with girls scoring higher than boys. 
The results of the study are summarized in the following table: 
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planation for the different responses in each setting is that children in 
the courtroom gave no answer to questions that children in the small 
room answered correctly. The responses of children in a small room 
were more complete than those of children in the courtroom. 
The present findings lend support to the argument that current 
courtroom procedures militate against eliciting complete testimony 
from children. There were several aspects of the courtroom situation 
that, when compared with the small room, may have contributed to 
this effect: the courtroom was large; the child had to sit farther from 
her parent(s); several people were present; the child witness was ques-
tioned by three unfamiliar men; the robed judge sat very close to the 
child; and the child was facing, and in close proximity to, the unpleas-
ant man from the videotaped portrayal. The combined effects of these 
variables evoked anxiety in the children, as demonstrated by their con-
versations with an experimenter after testifying.24 In addition, the "at-
torneys" informally noted many instances of nervousness in the 
children testifying in court (e.g., twisting hair, attempting to leave the 
witness stand or the courtroom before the end of the session, shaking, 
and in one instance crying). 
When asked to point to the man from the videotape, only nine 
children positively identified the "defendant" in the courtroom, 
although three others glanced at him often throughout the session. 
Either these three children did not recognize the man, or they did not 
admit that they did. 
The poor identification results of the study probably understate the 
effects of stress on the child's willingness or ability to testify; in actual 
abuse cases, the testifying child-victim usually knows the defendant.25 
Measure Probability Direction 
Free Recall 
Central Items p .5. .087 Small > court-
room room 
Irrelevant Details n.s.• 
Specific Questions 
Correct p .5. .104 Small > court-
room room 
Incorrect n.s.• 
"Do Not Know" p < .021 Small > court-
room room 
•n.s. = not significant 
24. The experimenter asked both groups of children how they felt about testifying at the end 
of the second session. Most of the children said they liked answering the questions, or thought it 
was "okay," with a few exceptions from the children in the courtroom. Many of those who 
testified in the courtroom said they were nervous, embarrassed, or scared, although a few said 
that they felt good. In the small room, the children expressed nervousness and "feeling good" 
about equally. Most of the children in the courtroom said they would not ever want to testify 
again, although a few said they might be willing when they were older. In the small room, 
children expressed more willingness to participate in a similar procedure in the future. 
25. See MacFarlane, supra note 1, at 86. 
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In the present study, the child witness was not a victim of the defen-
dant; thus, the child did not suffer the trauma of confronting a recog-
nized person who had assaulted her. The children participating in the 
study were not victims of, or witnesses to an actual crime. For chil-
dren who are victims of sexual abuse, or who are in some way trauma-
tized, it is likely that the problems indicated in this study would be 
much more pronounced and extend beyond reluctance to identify the 
assailant. In an actual trial, child sexual abuse victims must face the 
alleged abuser; this study could not allow so stressful a condition.26 
These results indicate that steps should be taken to help child par-
ticipants in trials be more comfortable to enable them to testify more 
completely and accurately. The next section examines some efforts 
that have been made in this area and concludes that many of them fall 
far short of achieving their intended result. 
B. Efficacy of State Reforms 
The National Conference of the Judiciary27 and the Attorney Gen-
eral's Task Force on Family Violence28 have recommended the use of 
videotapes in lieu of live testimony when children must testify in abuse 
cases. Most recently, the American Bar Association has approved the 
following recommendation of its Criminal Justice Section: 
The use of alternate means of presenting a child's testimony to the court 
via closed circuit television, through a one-way mirror, or by videotape 
represents a responsible and compassionate approach to the dilemma of 
securing the child's testimony with a minimum of contact with the 
defendant and spectators while at the same time preserving a defendant's 
confrontational right. Its development and use merits serious con-
sideration. 29 
26. Further studies are needed to confirm the results of the present investigation. An impor-
tant comparison would examine the differences between children who recognize a defendant and 
those who do not. Studies that separate the array of variables in the present study (e.g., size of 
the room, number of people present, number of questioners, presence and proximity of the de-
fendant, and presence and attire of the judge) would be invaluable in pinpointing the sources of 
the differences in recall ability and in willingness to speak. Another interesting comparison 
would be to examine how the setting affects children who had witnessed a live event rather than a 
videotaped scene. Additional empirical investigations would enhance understanding of chil-
dren's abilities as witnesses. 
27. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, STATEMENT OF 
RECOMMENDED JUDICIAL PRACTICES, (adopted by the National Conference of the Judiciary on 
the Rights of Victims of Crime) (1983). 
28. ATIORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT 27, 33 
(1984). 
29. SECTION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR THE 
FAIR TREATMENT OF CHILD WITNESSES IN CASES WHERE CHILD ABUSE IS ALLEGED 30 
(1985). 
On May 16, 1985, Senator Jeremiah Denton introduced a bill to amend Chapter XIV of the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 to provide funds to encourage states to develop pro-
tective reforms for the investigation and adjudication of child abuse cases, entitled The Child 
Victim Witness Protection Act of 1985. S. 1156, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 6323 
(1985). Senator Denton's bill would authorize grants to states that introduce measures for the 
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In an effort to diminish the trauma suffered by child witnesses in 
sexual abuse cases, 30 twenty-five states have adopted legislation per-
mitting a child's videotaped statements or depositions to be introduced 
as evidence at child abuse trials.31 These laws differ in several impor-
protection of child victims. Such measures must "minimize the additional trauma to the child 
and improve the chances of successful criminal prosecution or legal action." S. 1156, 99th 
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(b) (1985). These measures may include "establishing procedures for the 
videotaping of the child victim's statement and testimony •... " S. 1156, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 
§ 3(c)(2)(D). Dr. Ellen Greenberg, Administrative Officer for Child, Youth and Family Policy 
of the American Psychological Association, testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile 
Justice supporting the bill. Dr. Greenberg explained that: 
[R]efonns designed to improve the chances of successful criminal prosecution or legal action 
in child abuse cases can also be expected to reduce the potential for further traumatization 
of the child victim. These reforms include the use of videotaping and closed-circuit televi· 
sion which provide alternatives to the actual courtroom participation of the child victim 
The Child Victim Witness Protection Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 1156 Before the Subcomm. on 
Juvenile Justice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 187 (1985). 
Senator Denton's bill was introduced just prior to unanimous Senate approval of Senator 
Paula Hawkins' Children's Justice Act. Child Abuse Legislation in the 99th Cong.: Joint Hear-
ings on S. 140 Before the Subcomm. on Select Education of the House Comm. on Education and 
Labor, and the Subcomm. on Court and· Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1985). The Hawkins bill amends the Child Abuse Prevention and 
Treatment Act to establish within the Department of Health and Human Services a new federal 
grant program to assist the states in developing programs like those in Senator Denton's bill. 
Neither of these bills attempts to develop procedures to help children; they are essentially purse-
string bills designed to stimulate innovation in state legislatures. 
30. Sexual abuse cases that require a child to relive her harrowing experiences for the court-
room audience are not the only type oflitigation in which a child who has witnessed a traumatic 
event may be required to explain to the court "what happened." Witnessing the death of another 
person is traumatic for anyone, but much more so for a child witnessing the death of a parent. 
Such a child is likely to exhibit post-traumatic stress disorder. The child also faces many of the 
same courtroom anxieties as abuse victims. See generally Pynoos & Eth, The Child As Witness to 
Homicide, 40, No.2 J. Soc. IssuES 87 (1984). Fortunately, the number of child witnesses to 
homicide is not as overwhelming as the number of abused children. Yet, there are a number of 
youngsters who do witness violent crimes. Pynoos and Eth note: 
[O]fthe 2000 homicides in its jurisdiction in 1982, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Homi-
cide Division estimates that approximately 200 had a dependent youngster as a witness •••• 
The assailant's relationship to the child has fallen into one of the following three categories: 
the other parent (35%), a friend or other relative (30%), or a stranger (35%). 
Id. at 88. These percentages indicate that the child witness of a homicide, like the sexually 
abused child, is likely to be asked to testify against a parent or friend. Because these children 
face similar difficulties as abused children, the concerns raised in this Note might apply equally 
well to a child who witnesses parenticide. 
31. See ALA. CoDE § 15-25-2 (Supp. 1986); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.047 (1984); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2311 to -2312 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-2035 to -2036 (Supp. 1985); 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (Deering Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413 (1986); 1985 
Conn. Acts 85-587 (Jan. Sess) reprinted in CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN., app. at 337 (West 1986); 
DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.90 (West Supp. 1984); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3433 to -3434 (Supp. 1986); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (Michie/ 
Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 492.304 (Vernon Supp. 1987); MONT. CoDE ANN. §§ 46-15-40, 46-15-401 (1983); NEV, REV. 
STAT. § 174.227 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 30-9-17 (Supp. 1986); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 190.32 (McKinney Supp. 1987) (grand jury 
proceedings); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 753 (West Supp. 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 11-37-13.2 
(Supp. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§§ 23A-12-9 to -10 (Supp. 1986); TEX. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5 (Supp. 1986); Vt. 
R. Evid. 807; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 967.04(7) (West Supp. 1986). Most of these state statutes 
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tant respects, and this variability may be attributable to states' relative 
uncertainty regarding constitutional constraints imposed by the sixth 
amendment's confrontation clause. The defendant's constitutional 
right to confrontation necessarily narrows the alternatives that states 
may consider in providing for child witnesses. The Supreme Court 
has yet to address the relationship between state measures protecting 
child witnesses and the defendant's confrontation rights. 
1. Physical Confrontation with the Defendant 
Many states which permit videotaped testimony require the de-
fendant's presence at the taping session. 32 Most often the videotaping 
occurs in the judge's chambers33 or a similar environment, 34 and the 
defendant is given the opportunity to cross-examine the child fully. 
When these procedures are followed, the videotape can generally be 
presented at trial in lieu of the child's direct testimony.35 
Statutes of this type have overemphasized the defendant's need for 
confrontation and underemphasized the psychological trauma for the 
child witness. While the intentions of such procedural reforms are ad-
mirable, the changes may not fully benefit either the child or the fair 
administration of justice. Empirical research suggests that requiring 
physical confrontation with the defendant damages the reliability, 
contain language that explicitly or implicitly suggests that the purpose of the statute is to de-
crease trauma suffered by children who must participate in the criminal justice process. See, e.g., 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346(d) (Deering Supp. 1987) (allowing videotaped testimony if "further 
testimony would cause the victim emotional trauma so that the victim is medically unavailable"). 
32. The states requiring that the defendant be present at the videotaping include Alaska, 
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Kentucky, Maine, Montana, New Mexico, Texas, and 
Wisconsin. Typical is the Arizona statute: 
Upon request of either party, the court may order all questioning of a minor witness to be 
videotaped in the judge's chambers in the presence of the defendant, defendant's counsel, the 
prosecuting attorney or plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel as the case may be and the court for 
presentation to the jury as evidence at such time as the court determines is proper. 
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2312 (1982). See also note 31 supra· and accompanying text. 
33. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 43-2036 (Supp. 1985) ("The videotaped deposition shall be 
taken before the judge in chambers in the presence of the prosecuting attorney, the defendant and 
his attorneys."). 
34. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 967.04(8)(b)(2) (West Supp. 1986). 
35. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 43-3036 (Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 30-9-17 (Supp. 
1986); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 967.04(9) (West Supp. 1986). Most of the statutes explicitly require 
some showing of unavailability of the child. The exact nature of the showing differs from state to 
state. In Florida and Wisconsin, the court can grant an order to videotape only if there is a 
substantial likelihood that the child will suffer "severe emotional or mental strain" if required to 
testify in open court. FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 90.90 (West Supp. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 
§ 23A-12-9 (Supp. 1986). The Arkansas and New Mexico statutes require the court to find 
"good cause shown" before granting a videotape order, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43.2036 (Supp. 
1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (Supp. 1986), and California and Colorado require medical 
unavailability, CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1346(d) (Deering Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-
413 (1986). Not all of the states have unavailability requirements. The Montana statute explic-
itly states that "[t]he victim need not be physically present in the courtroom when the videotape 
is admitted into evidence." MONT. CoDE ANN. § 46-15-401 (1983). 
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quality, and often the very existence of the child's testimony.36 Psy-
chological research indicates that direct confrontation with a defen-
dant has a clearly detrimental impact on memory.37 A survey of 
professionals working with child victim-witnesses in the criminal jus-
tice system revealed that the children's 
most frequently mentioned fear was facing the defendant. That experi-
ence is frightening for most adults, but to a child who does not under-
stand the reason for confrontation, the anticipation and experience of 
being in close proximity to the defendant can be overwhelming. This 
fear was mentioned by virtually all respondents, including police, social 
workers, advocates, therapists, doctors, and judges. 3 8 
Even those states that allow videotaping in a comfortable setting -
such as the judge's chambers - fail to lessen pressure on a child when 
they also require the defendant to be present. The defendant's pres-
ence, even in less threatening surroundings, creates anxiety and lessens 
the value of a child's testimony.39 Texas and Kentucky have a more 
logical approach which allows the defendant to observe and hear the 
testimony personally but shields the defendant from the witness' 
view.40 
36. See, e.g., notes 21-26 supra and accompanying text. 
37. See Dent & Stephenson, Identification Evidence: Experimental Investigations of Factors 
Affecting the Reliability of Juvenile and Adult Witnesses, in PSYCHOLOGY, LA w AND LEGAL 
PROCESSES 195 (1979). Dent and Stephenson revealed interesting results in several studies of 
eyewitness identification. In the first of these experiments, adults were shown a film of an office 
break-in, and then required to identify the criminal either from a live lineup or from a set oflife-
size color slides. There was no significant difference in the identifications. In the second study, 
children witnessed a workman enter their classroom, and were later asked to identify the man 
from a lineup or from slides. Children were correct significantly more often when identifying 
from slides. In the live lineup condition, agitation and nervousness were noted in the children, 
and two refused to participate in the identification process. A third experiment involved college 
students who witnessed a man and a woman enter their classroom to talk about an experiment. 
In this study, an additional identification procedure was included: a one-way window. There 
were significant differences in these conditions, with the window producing the most correct 
identifications, and the line-up the least correct. The difference in the last manipulation was 
entirely due to the responses of the women; the men responded equally in all three conditions. 
These last two studies appear to contradict an experiment by Marquis, Marshall, and Os-
kamp. See Marquis, Marshall & Oskamp, Testimony Validity as a Function of Question Form, 
Atmosphere and Item Difficulty, 2 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 167 (1972). Here, adult sub-
jects were shown a videotape, asked for free reports, and then interrogated. The interviewer was 
either challenging or supportive. Results indicated that the uncomfortable atmosphere associ-
ated with the challenging interviewer did not affect the accuracy or completeness of the subjects' 
responses. In order to understand the conflict in results between the Dent and Marquis experi-
ments, the differences in the procedures must be emphasized. For both groups, no differences 
were found as a result of an intimidating atmosphere if the witnessed event was on film rather 
than live. In addition, subjects in the Marquis study did not have to confront the "criminal,'' 
whereas all of the subjects in the Dent studies did. Finally, the Marquis study only looked at the 
responses of adults, not children. 
38. WHITCOMB, supra note 11, at 17-18. 
39. Id. at 49. 
40. "The court shall permit the defendant to observe and hear the testimony of the child in 
person but shall ensure that the child cannot hear or see the defendant." KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 421.350(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071(4) 
(Vernon Supp. 1987). See also WHITCOMB, supra note 11, at 55. 
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Not only is fear of facing the defendant and defense counsel dam-
aging to the child witness' ability to testify, anxiety from being in a 
hostile environment exacerbates the damage. A child may be over-
whelmed by an unfamiliar and unusual situation; she must expend 
considerable cognitive effort identifying items and comprehending the 
nature of the task at hand. Several researchers have found that accu-
racy and efficiency of recall diminish when a person is questioned in a 
hostile environment.41 The probability of accurate testimony, there-
fore, is markedly reduced,42 and the probative value of the testimony 
is diminished by the anxiety produced in such circumstances. 43 
2. Cross-Examination 
Many of the states that require the defendant to be present also 
require an opportunity for traditional cross-examination.44 Unlike its 
truth-enhancing effect on adults, cross-examination employed as a 
means to elicit further details from children significantly impairs the 
completeness and accuracy of their answers.45 The style of cross-ex-
amination is more likely to generate inaccurate testimony than is the 
age of the witness. 46 "Although cross-examination can be anxiety pro-
41. See note 37 supra, and 45-47 infra and accompanying text. 
42. See Dent & Stephenson, supra note 37; Lord, Experimentally Induced Variations in Ror-
schach Performance, 64 PSYCHOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS No. 10 (1950); Zimmerman & Bauer, 
Effect of an Audience Upon What Is Remembered, 20 PUB. OPINION Q. 238 (1956). 
43. See generally Melton, Children's Competency to Testify, 5 L. & HUM. BEHAVIOR 73 
(1981). Anecdotal evidence of the effect of the courtroom environment on children can provide 
some view of what the child must endure if called to testify. Pynoos and Eth give several exam-
ples, one of which follows: 
Four-year-old Julie was not prepared for the sight of her father, the defendant, whom she 
had not seen in over six months, dressed in prison garb. On her way to the stand, she 
walked over and gave him a big hug. Without explanation to the child, the judge suddenly 
excused the jury who got up and left. He would not allow a trusted adult to sit with the 
child on the witness stand, but left her to sit in a witness chair obviously oversized for her. 
Once seated, she placed both hands over her mouth. The district attorney began the exami-
nation by showing her a coloring book; she shrugged silently, and the judge looked annoyed. 
The district attorney then asked her if she was a girl or a boy, and she fidgeted shyly. The 
judge interrupted by stating, "It doesn't appear to the court that she can qualify." He then 
abruptly dismissed her. Without her testimony, the father was acquitted and Julie was re-
turned to his care. This child was never given the opportunity to demonstrate that she could 
relate the material facts of the event. 
Pynoos & Eth, supra note 30, at 100-01. This example is taken from Evers v. State, 84 Neb. 708, 
121 N.W. 1005 (1909). Julie's father was on trial for murdering her mother. While this case 
represents only one incident, the inability of young victim-witnesses to perform in court in many 
cases results in failure to provide justice for them. See WHITCOMB, supra note 11, at 20, (citing 
B. Woodling, Diagnosis for Child Molestation, paper presented at Protecting Our Children: The 
Fight Against Molestation, A National Symposium, Washington, D.C., Oct. 3, 1984). 
44. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.§ 12.45.047 (1984); MONT. CODE ANN.§§ 46-15-40, 46-15-401 
(1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-12-9 to -10 (Supp. 1986). 
45. Stem, The Psychology of Testimony, 34 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 3, 20 (1939). See 
also notes 19-26 supra and accompanying text. 
46. NATIONAL LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION, 
AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW 136 (4th ed. 1983) [here-
inafter CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW]. 
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ducing for anyone, children do not understand its purpose, or why 
someone is trying to discredit them. A child is no match for a defense 
attorney."47 
Thus, allowing the defense attorney an opportunity to cross-ex-
amine the child witness in a small room, at close range, and usually 
without a support person present,48 negates the benefits of the im-
proved environment. It is unrealistic to expect defense counsel to be 
less intimidating in a smaller room, since she has an obligation to be a 
zealous advocate for her client. 49 The information processing theory 
of memory and cognition coupled with the results of the empirical 
work undertaken by the authors suggest that if children testify in a 
smaller, less threatening environment, they can provide truthful, de-
tailed answers without traditional cross-examination.so 
3. Uses of Videotaped Testimony 
The state legislatures' intent to protect a defendant's right of con-
frontation is most apparent in the sections of state acts that direct 
videotape use. States have taken two basic approaches. Some, such as 
South Dakota, Colorado, and California51 treat the videotape as for-
mer testimony of the child witness. 52 Courts have established that 
under this type of statute former testimony may be offered when "fair-
ness allows imposing, upon the party against whom now offered, the 
handling of the witness on the earlier occasion. "53 Each of these states 
further require that cross-examination take place during the 
videotaping. 
A second and far more disturbing use of videotaping is employed 
in New Mexico, Arkansas, and Wisconsin.54 These states require that 
the videotaped testimony may be admissible at trial and received into 
47. WHITCOMB, supra note 11, at 18. 
48. Kentucky, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Texas allow a support person to be present during 
closed circuit television testimony and cross-examination. See WHITCOMB, supra note 11, at 49-
50. 
49. While it seems clear that traditional in-court cross-examination and even statutorily per· 
mitted out-of-court cross-examination of the child may be damaging to the child's testimony, 
some prosecutors have suggested that putting the child before the jury during the direct examina· 
tion is very powerful evidence. WHITCOMB, supra note 11, at 66, notes that one prosecutor 
"much preferred to 'let the jury see the little angel.' " 
50. See WHITCOMB, supra note 11, at 33-34. See also Pynoos & Eth, supra note 30, at 98 
("We believe that the child and the Jaw are better served by the child being allowed to recount 
the events in his or her own way, at his or her own pace, and with his or her own emphasis."). 
51. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9 (Supp. 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413 
(1986); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346(d) (Deering Supp. 1986). 
52. The language in§ 1346(d) of the California Penal Code is illustrative: "(The] court may 
admit the video tape of the victim's testimony at the preliminary hearing as former testimony 
under Section 1291 of the Evidence Code." 
53. FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(l) advisory committee's note. 
54. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (Supp. 1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2036 (Supp. 1985); 
WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 967.04(7) (West Supp. 1986). 
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evidence in lieu of the victim's direct testimony. Such a procedure 
gives the defendant two opportunities to cross-examine and intimidate 
the child, since the statutes provide that the defendant be present with 
the child during the recording of the direct and then again during the 
in-court cross-examination. This procedure is more damaging to the 
child than merely testifying at trial. 55 
A better approach is that taken by Kentucky and Texas.56 These 
statutes make a videotaped statement of the child admissible (where no 
cross-examination occurs at the recording session) and allow the op-
posing party to cross-examine the child on the stand. If the child's 
direct testimony is videotaped outside the courtroom, and the defen-
dant has an opportunity to cross-examine during the recording ses-
sion, the child cannot be required to testify in court. This procedure 
eliminates the cross-examination "double threat" facing the child wit-
ness in New Mexico, Arkansas, and Wisconsin.57 Although these re-
forms are much needed, they require fine tuning. The following 
section contains suggestions for such improvements. 
C. A Proposal for Enhancing Child Witness Protection Statutes 
When the judicial system treats children insensitively, the quality 
of their participation suffers, thereby lessening the likelihood that jus-
tice will be done. The procedures outlined below will help the child 
tell her story clearly, fully, and accurately while shielding her from 
excessive trauma. 58 
Video technology could be used in two phases of the trial process, 
beginning with videotaping the child's initial statement prior to any 
legal action. This "investigatory" tape would not be used at trial un-
less necessary to corroborate or impeach later testimony. The tape 
55. A recent opinion by the New Mexico Court of Appeals has interpreted the state's video-
taping statute in a way that prevents this possible second cross-examination of the child victim-
witness. In State v. Tafoya, 729 P.2d 1371 (N.M. 1986), the court held that a defendant in a 
control booth viewing the proceedings was "present" within the meaning of the statute. 729 P.2d 
at 1373. 
56. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); TEX. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1987). 
57. Yet another group of states never explains how the videotape may be used at trial. 
Maine, Montana, and Florida merely direct that the recorded testimony may be presented at trial 
and received into evidence. The statutes do not elucidate how much weight is to be given to the 
videotape once admitted. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 (Supp.1986); MONT. CODE 
ANN. §§ 46-15-40, 46-15-401 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.90 (West Supp. 1984). The Maine 
and Montana statutes also require that the witness be cross-examined during the taping session. 
(fhis may indicate that the recorded testimony is to be treated as former testimony as above.) 
The uncertainty as to the use of the videotape at trial may mean either that the statutes were not 
carefully considered, or that they were attempts to give judges a great deal of discretion for 
proceeding with varying facts. 
58. The procedures were developed with considerable help from Donald Duquette and Con-
stance Jones of the Child Advocacy Law Clinic of the University of Michigan. 
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would be viewed only by social service personnel and persons needed 
to determine whether further legal action is warranted. 
Several reasons favor a videotaping of the child's initial statement. 
First, since the initial statement would occur soon after the incident of 
alleged abuse, the child's recollection would be vivid and detailed. 
Second, the possibility of retraction of the child's testimony due to 
pressure from family members in intrafamilial cases would be reduced, 
as there would be less time for the child to be pressured. Third, 
greater accuracy would result, as testimony would not be rehearsed. 
Fourth, less trauma would be sustained by the child, since she would 
be subjected to fewer interviews. s9 
A single skilled interviewer should conduct the interview. Pres-
ently, the child may be interviewed by many persons, all with different 
styles of interaction and with different investigatory goals. Because 
many interviewers are either ignorant of or insensitive to the special 
needs and abilities of children in such situations, the child's testimony 
may appear to be, at best, not wholly reliable and, at worst, totally 
unusable. 60 One skilled interviewer, with special training in working 
with children in tense situations, is best able to elicit reliable and use-
ful testimony from the child. Ideally a community should have a pool 
of interviewers trained both in evidence and in questioning children. 
Such a group could be developed through local child abuse/neglect 
programs, special police units, special prosecutor's groups, and local 
social services departments. 
Because an investigatory videotape would not preclude a child's 
being called to testify, 61 a second phase of the trial process would in-
volve videotaping the witness' actual testimony. When further legal 
action is deemed necessary, a "litigation" videotape would be prepared 
through a series of steps. Once the defendant has obtained counsel 
and has had time to develop a case plan, a special hearing would be 
held to develop a preliminary set of questions acceptable to all par-
ties. 62 The answers to these questions will form the basis of the child's 
testimony. Some of the questions could be altered during testimony as 
needed. The testimony should be taped in a small room with a one-
way mirror through which the defendant, prosecutor, defense counsel, 
judge and public can monitor the testimony of the child. A skilled 
59. WHITCOMB, supra note 11, at 99-100. 
60. A recent article in the National Law Journal tells of a Hawaiian state court's ruling that 
two sexually molested girls were incompetent to testify because their accusations against the 
defendant were likely the result of "layers and layers of interviews, questions, examinations, etc., 
which were fraught with textbook examples of poor interview techniques." Catterall, Children's 
Testimony Blocked, Natl. L.J., Feb. 3, 1986, at 6, col. 2. 
61. The investigatory tape is merely the first statement of the child. It is not sworn 
testimony. 
62. The need for such a hearing could be obviated in the event that the parties could agree 
and stipulate to the set of questions. 
February 1987] Note - Videotaping Children~ Testimony 825 
interviewer should question the child alone. 63 
To facilitate the examination, an interviewer should wear a hearing 
device that enables the judge, lawyers, and/or defendant to communi-
cate with the interviewer and control the flow of the examination. 64 
The judge should be present to rule on objections to questions asked, 
changed, or added, at this time. Since the attorneys would agree in 
advance on the full battery of questions, the child need not take the 
stand at trial. 
This proposed use of videotapes is similar to the Texas and Ken-
tucky statutory methods but with one major difference: a single 
skilled interviewer would interview the child. This idea is not novel. 
Dustin Ordway developed a similar proposal for videotaping child in-
cest victims' testimony.65 Under his proposal, the expert who works 
alone with the child66 would be called to testify as to the child's non-
verbal behavior. 
The proposals put forth in this Note calling for the use of video-
tapes to present children's initial statements and testimony are based 
on the psychological capabilities of children. Part II balances these 
proposals against the defendant's right of confrontation. 
II. COURTS, CONFRONTATION AND VIDEOTAPES 
Allowing videotaped testimony to be presented as the functional 
equivalent of live testimony raises important constitutional issues. 
Specifically, some claim that presenting a videotape of the witness' tes-
timony in lieu of the actual appearance of the child infringes the de-
fendant's right to confront his accusers. 67 This section will 
63. Admittedly, some may object that no one interviewer can adequately interrogate the 
child for both sides. However, the alternative of using two skilled interviewers merely substitutes 
interviewers for attorneys; the same dangers of intimidation of the child by the defendant's inter-
viewer will be inevitable. 
64. In State v. Tafoya, the court approved the use of a head set and a microphone for the 
same purpose as that advocated here. 729 P.2d 1371, 1373 (N.M. 1986). 
65. Ordway explains that "[u]nder the proposed reform, the child's only contact with the 
legal system would be through a specially trained social services worker • . . . At trial, relevant 
portions of the recordings would be played in lieu of the victim's personal testimony." Note, 
Parent-Child Incest: Proof at Trial Without Testimony in Court by the Victim, 15 U. MICH. J. L. 
REF. 133, 139-40 (1981) (footnotes omitted). 
66. Ordway details expert requirements as follows: "This expert must have dual qualifica-
tions: first he or she must be qualified to deal with victims of child sexual abuse; and second, he 
or she must be familiar enough with legal standards and practices to assist the trier of fact in 
assessing the victim's credibility." Note, supra note 65, at 139-40. 
67. The confrontation clause comes to us, some argue, as a result of the infamous trial by 
affidavit of Sir Walter Raleigh. An integral element of the evidence against Raleigh consisted of 
statements of one Cobham, who later recanted his tale. Raleigh was not allowed to call Cobham, 
nor did the state call him as a witness, and Raleigh was convicted. See generally HELLER, THE 
SIXTH AMENDMENT 104 (1961). 
To remedy this type of conviction by affidavit, our Founding Fathers created the confronta-
tion clause of the sixth amendment: "[T]he accused shall enjoy the right ..• to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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demonstrate that the defendant's confrontation right is preserved 
under the suggested reforms. 68 
A review of the United States Supreme Court decisions interpret-
ing the confrontation clause reveals that "confrontation" is a combina-
tion of three factors. Generally, in order to find adequate 
confrontation, the Court requires that (1) the defendant have face-to-
face meetings with the witness, (2) the defendant have the opportunity 
to cross-examine the witness, and (3) the factfinder have the ability to 
view the demeanor of the witness. 69 Thus, to be admitted into evi-
dence, videotaped testimony must satisfy each of these elements. Al-
ternatively, it must fall within the scope of an exception to the 
confrontation clause. 
There are a plethora of circumstances in which the court permits 
"nonconfrontation." The confrontation right can be waived, 70 its de-
nial can be harmless error,71 it can be subject to balancing against 
other interests, 72 and subject to exception. 73 The Supreme Court rec-
ognized early on that confrontation issues must be handled flexibly, 
68. Because children were deemed incompetent to testify they were probably not considered 
when the confrontation clause was drafted. See Goodman, Children's Testimony in Historical 
Perspective, 40, No.2 J. Soc. ISSUES 9, 12 (1984). 
One could plausibly argue that the draftsmen of the confrontation clause wanted to ensure 
that anyone accusing another would face that person in court, under oath. The exact motivation 
of the authors of the clause is, however, uncertain. One commentator explains that: 
[T]he right of an accused "to be confronted by the witnesses against him" is seldom men-
tioned in early historical documents. The precise source of this use of the word "confront" is 
obscure, and the remembered harms or injuries suffered or feared by the colonists which 
impelled them to add this right to the panoply of guarantees of the sixth amendment cumu-
late at best to only a sketchy relevant historical background. It is not too surprising, there-
fore, to discover that the exact import of the federal right to be "confronted" by witnesses 
has been varyingly conceived over the years. 
Larkin, The Right of Confrontation: What Next?, 1 TEX. TECH L. REV. 67 (1969); see also 
Comment, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 15 YALE L.J. 1434, 1436 n.10 (1966); Note, 
Preserving the Right to Confrontation -A New Approach to Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trials, 
113 U. PA. L. REv. 741, 742 (1965); Note, Confrontation, Cross-Examination, and the Right to 
Prepare a Defense, 56 GEO. L.J. 939, 953 (1968). 
Since children did not testify in the eighteenth century in the United States, the draftsmen 
may have envisioned two men facing one another in court. In this scenario the intuitive belief 
that facing the accused would make the accuser more honest may have had some truth to it. 
However, psychological pressures are different when the witness is a child who does not under· 
stand why she must again face her attacker. By requiring a child to testify in court as to inci-
dents surrounding sexual abuse or another traumatizing event, the criminal justice system treats 
children like adult men. 
69. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). 
70. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1357-59 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 
914 (1977) (discussing express waiver, waiver by stipulation as to admission of evidence, waiver 
by guilty plea, waiver by absence from the jurisdiction, and waiver by misconduct). 
71. Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 74-75 (1979); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430-32 
(1972). 
72. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 
295 (1973)); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895). 
73. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965) (dying declarations and former testi· 
mony of deceased witnesses admissible without violating confrontation clause). 
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noting that the right of confrontation "must occasionally give way to 
considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case."74 This 
Note argues that this language applies to child participants in the 
criminal "justice system. 
A. Physical Confrontation 
Because of psychological differences between children and adults, 
children should not be compelled to face the defendant in court. The 
Supreme Court has ruled that there is no absolute requirement of 
physical confrontation at trial; there exist exceptions to the need for 
physical presence as an element of confrontation. In Mattox v. United 
States, 75 the Court admitted the testimony of two witnesses who died 
before the defendant's second trial occurred. It noted that "[a] techni-
cal adherence to the letter of a constitutional provision may occasion-
ally be carried farther than is necessary to the just protection of the 
accused, and farther than the safety of the public will warrant. "76 
Similarly, in Ohio v. Roberts, 77 the Court "recognized that competing 
interests, if 'closely examined' . . . may warrant dispensing with con-
frontation at trial."78 The goals of protecting child victims and secur-
ing their best testimony present such interests. 
If a child is compelled to be physically present in court, the psy-
chological cost can be quite severe.79 This cost may ultimately be 
passed on to society if, as a result of the child's inability to testify, a 
guilty perpetrator is improperly released. 80 Trauma that children may 
suffer during litigation often either prevents prosecutors from bringing 
sexual abuse or molestation cases, or causes them to be abandoned 
prematurely. 81 After enduring the trauma of sexual abuse, children 
asked to testify in court can "become so further traumatized by the 
prospect of testifying in front of their abusers that they cannot speak 
74. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895). 
75. 156 U.S. 237 (1895). 
76. 156 U.S. at 243. 
77. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
78. 448 U.S. at 64. 
79. Studies indicate that child sexual assault victims who participate in judicial proceedings 
suffer more psychological harm than children not appearing in court. See S. KATZ & M. 
MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VICTIM, 199-200 (1979), (citing Wells, 1961; Reifen, 
1958; Gibbens and Prince, 1963; DeFrancis, 1969; and Henriques, 1961). See also note 91 infra. 
80. See Note, supra note 65, at 148 n.79 (the current procedures requiring child in-court 
testimony result in useless prosecutions which waste court resources, prevent treatment of true 
sex offenders, and hurt the integrity of the judicial system). 
81. "One attorney, who had handled thirty to forty of these cases ••• was able to complete a 
trial in only one [instance]." State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 417, 484 A.2d 1330, 1333 
(1984). Another attorney working for a prosecutor's office reports that "[n]early 90% of the 
child abuse cases were dismissed as a result of problems attending the testimony of children who 
could not deal with the prospect of facing fathers, stepfathers, relatives and strangers in a court-
room setting." 197 N.J. Super. at 417, 484 A.2d at 1333. 
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about the central happenings" of the incident or incidents. 82 These 
special circumstances require flexibility in the application of confron-
tation clause requirements - especially the requirement of face-to-
face meeting of the victim and the alleged abuser - to the use of 
videotaped child testimony. 
Several state courts have ruled that the use of videotaped testi-
mony of sexually abused children can satisfy the confrontation clause 
without physical meeting. For example, in Jolly v. State 83 and Alexan-
der v. State 84 two Texas appellate courts upheld the convictions of 
defendants charged with aggravated sexual assault. Each court found 
that, as long as the child was available for in-court testimony, the 
videotaping statute did not violate the confrontation rights of the de-
fendants, even if the victim did not meet the defendant face-to-face.85 
While some courts rely on United States Supreme Court precedent 
for authorizing exceptions to the requirement of physical meeting, 
other courts read the same cases more narrowly. They argue that the 
use of videotapes violates the defendant's right to confrontation. 86 
The Court, however, has not heard a case involving the admissibility 
of videotapes. Therefore these early cases may be weak precedent 
82. Sheppard, 191 N.J. Super. at 419, 484 A.2d at 1333. 
83. 681 S.W.2d 689 (fex. 1984). 
84. 692 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1985). 
85. Other state courts have reached the same conclusion as the Jolly court. In Sheppard, the 
New Jersey Superior Court held that despite a lack of eye contact between the child witness and 
the defendant, where the defendant, judge, jury, and spectators could see and hear the child 
clearly on videotape, and where adequate opportunity for cross-examination was provided, the 
defendant was not denied his confrontation guarantee under the sixth amendment. In State v. 
Melendez, 135 Ariz. 390, 661 P.2d 654 (1982), an Arizona appellate court upheld the defendant's 
conviction for child molestation where the victim's testimony was videotaped. After hearing 
testimony from a clinical psychologist that the child would become uncommunicative if called to 
testify, the court found that the "circumstances justified the trial court's invocation of modern 
technology to meet the special needs of a witness and to afford the defendant his constitutional 
right of confrontation." 135 Ariz. at 393, 661 P.2d at 657. The Montana Supreme Court, while 
not mentioning the confrontation clause specifically, found that videotaped testimony of the de-
fendant's five-year-old daughter about her sexual activities with the defendant, together with 
testimony by a psychologist that the daughter was capable of providing reliable testimony, was 
sufficient to convict the defendant. State v. A.D.M., 701 P.2d 999 (Mont. 1985). For a similar 
holding, see State v. Sullivan, 360 N.W.2d 418 (Minn. 1985) (defendant, charged with sexually 
abusing his four-year-old son, was not denied a fair trial by introducing a videotaped interview of 
the victim by a police officer into evidence). 
86. Some courts have ruled that videotaped testimony may not be presented at trial. Courts 
which disallow the use of children's videotaped testimony do so generally on the premise that the 
defendant's right to confrontation cannot be limited by trauma suffered by the child witness. See, 
e.g., Vasquez v. State, 145 Tex. Crim. 376, 380, 167 S.W.2d 1030, 1032 (1942). 
Many of the opinions decrying the use of videotapes begin by noting that physical confronta-
tion as an element of the defendant's sixth amendment right was explained as early as 1899 in 
Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899). Soon afterwards, the court reiterated this require-
ment in Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911), in which confrontation was said to "se-
cure the right of the accused to meet the witness face-to-face." 221 U.S. at 330. The United 
States Supreme Court's most recent statement regarding the right to confrontation, Ohio v. Rob-
erts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), holds that "the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face·to-
face confrontation at trial." 448 U.S. at 63. 
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against the use of videotapes, especially given the "inability of nine-
teenth-century judges to foresee technological developments permit-
ting cross-examination and confrontation without physical 
presence. " 87 
Courts that narrowly construe Supreme Court precedent in forbid-
ding videotapes frequently rely on United States v. Benfield. 88 The 
Eighth Circuit found that an adult witness' inability to see the adult 
defendant during her videotaped testimony abridged the defendant's 
confrontation right. The witness' deposition had been taken while the 
defendant observed by monitor. The defendant could communicate 
with his attorney by sounding a buzzer which halted the deposition, 
enabling counsel to leave the room and confer with the client. The 
court concluded that "in some undefined but real way recollection, 
veracity, and communication are influenced by face-to-face 
challenge. "89 
Benfield should not control, however, when the videotaped depo-
nent is a child rather than an adult woman. Given the discussed dif-
ferences in the ways adults and children process information,90 it is 
apparent that the woman in Benfield may well have been able to with-
stand direct confrontation that a child could not.91 
B. Cross-Examination 
In Douglas v. Alabama, the Supreme Court noted that "[o]ur cases 
construing the [confrontation] clause hold that a primary interest se-
cured by it is the right of cross-examination; an adequate opportunity 
for cross-examination may satisfy the clause even in the absence of 
physical confrontation."92 This language suggests that cross-examina-
87. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW, supra note 46, at 188. 
88. 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979). 
89. 593 F.2d at 821. Following Benfield, some state courts have held that preventing the 
defendant and the child victim-witness from seeing each other during the child's testimony de-
nies the defendant the right of confrontation and forecloses "an effective method of determining 
veracity." Herbert v. Super. Ct., 117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 668, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850, 854 (1981). A 
Texas appellate court recently held unconstitutional the state's statute permitting videotaping 
children's testimony (fEX. CoDE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071 §§ (4)-(5) (Vernon Supp. 1987)) 
because it denied the defendant his right to a face-to-face meeting with the witnesses against him 
at trial. Powell v. State, 694 S.W.2d 416 (fex. 1985). In Powell, the court opined that "the 
witnesses on the part of the State shall be personally present when the accused is on trial." 694 
S.W.2d at 420, citing Kemper v. State, 63 Tex. Crim. 1, 138 S.W. 1025, 1038 (1911), overruled on 
other grounds, Robertson v. State, 63 Tex. Crim. 216, 142 S.W. 533, 546 (1911). The Powell 
court interpreted the statute to prevent the defendant from calling the child, whereas the Jolly 
and Alexander opinions interpreted the statute to mean that videotaping testimony may be per-
mitted as long as the witness is available. 
90. See subsection l.A.1. supra. 
91. The New Mexico Court of Appeals in Tafoya explained that the young victims of sexual 
attacks could not perform in court: "If required to testify in court in front of defendant, each 
child would have to undergo therapeutic intervention to repair the damage brought by simply 
testifying in that setting." 729 P.2d at 1375. 
92. 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965). The major purpose of cross-examination is to test the percep-
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tion is the crucial element of adequate confrontation.93 
Since cross-examination is an essential element of confrontation, 
any restriction on its use should not be accepted without close scru-
tiny. However, cross-examination, like the defendant's right to a face-
to-face meeting, is not absolute. The essence of cross-examination is 
that it tests the veracity of the witness' testimony. If that can be done 
reliably through other means, then traditional cross-examination is 
not essential. 94 
tion, memory, and credibility of witnesses. It also serves to test the witness' communication 
skills. SJ. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 139S (1974). Professor Wigmore has referred to cross-exam· 
ination as the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." Id. at § 1367. 
93. Even when a witness is available to testify, the right of confrontation may be violated if 
the defendant cannot cross-examine the witness. See generally Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. S6 
(1980). In California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), Justice White explained that an opportunity 
to effectively cross-examine was required to protect confrontation values. 399 U.S. at l6S. See 
also Kentucky v. Stincer, SS U.S.L.W. 4901, 4903 (U.S. June 16, 1987) ("the Confrontation 
Clause's functional purpose [is to ensure] a defendant an opportunity for cross-examination"), 
In Roberts, the Supreme Court formulated a test to determine the constitutional admissibility 
of uncross-examined out-of-court statements which would probably include videotaped testi-
mony. Finding that a transcript of a preliminary hearing was admissible, the Court held that the 
prosecution must "demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant whose statement it wishes to 
use against the defendant." 448 U.S. at 6S. Nevertheless, the Court most recently elaborated on 
this holding, explaining that "Roberts cannot fairly be read to stand for the radical proposition 
that no out-of-court statement can be introduced by the government without a showing that the 
declarant is unavailable." United States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121, 1126 (1986). In addition, the 
Court in Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2663 (1987), wrote that Roberts "held that an out-
of-court statement by an unavailable witness was sufficiently reliable to be admitted at trial, 
consistent with the Confrontation Clause, because defense counsel had engaged in full cross-
examination of the witness at the preliminary hearing where the statement was made." 
A child may be declared unavailable because psychological trauma likely to be suffered while 
testifying will impair her ability to communicate. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 
though not referring to children, has suggested: 
[T]he following matters are relevant to the question of psychological unavailability: (1) the 
probability of psychological injury as a result of testifying, (2) the degree of anticipated 
injury, (3) the expected duration of the injury, and (4) whether the expected psychological 
injury is substantially greater than the reaction of the average victim of a rape, kidnapping 
or terrorist act. Just as in the case of physical infirmity, it is difficult to state the precise 
quantum of evidence required to meet the standard of unavailability. The factors should be 
weighed in the context of each other, as well as in the context of the nature of the crime and 
the pre-existing psychological history of the witness. 
Warren v. United States', 436 A.2d 821, 830 n.18 (D.C. 1981). 
In Washington v. State, 452 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1984), a Florida appellate court would not require 
expert testimony to establish unavailability of a child witness: 
We do not accept Washington's argument that expert testimony must establish the necessity 
of videotaping testimony of a victim under the age of eleven. Section 918.17, Florida Stat· 
utes, gives the trial judge discretion to allow videotaping of a sexual battery victim eleven 
years of age or under when "(t]here is a substantial likelihood that such child will suffer 
severe emotional or mental strain if required to testify in open court." Here there is evi-
dence that the victim was under a severe emotional strain, reacting physically and emotion-
ally when informed of having to testify in court. It was within the trial judge's permissible 
discretion to have his testimony videotaped and presented. 
452 So. 2d at 83. 
94. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 166. While Green requires an opportunity to 
effectively cross-examine, such examination need not necessarily occur at trial. In fact, it could 
occur at the preliminary hearing. Justice White explains: 
If Porter had died or was otherwise unavailable, the confrontation clause would not have 
been violated by admitting his testimony given at the preliminary hearing - the right of 
February 1987] Note - Videotaping Children's Testimony 831 
Because of the difficulty of cross-examining children, some courts 
have permitted the use of video technology.95 For example, in State v. 
Sheppard, the court explained that using videotapes in such situations 
does not infringe the defendant's confrontation right because "there is, 
in fact, no curtailment of cross-examination, only a restriction upon 
the means of transmitting questions and answers."96 
When used with children, traditional cross-examination results in 
unreliable testimony.97 Another means should thus be employed to 
test the veracity of the child witness' testimony. As previously noted, 
a trained expert asking questions of the child, in a small environment, 
can elicit more reliable answers than would be delivered in court.98 
Such a procedure satisfies the truth-seeking function of cross-examina-
tion. The defendant and his attorney have the ability to ask questions 
of the child (through the expert), further preserving this vital element 
of confrontation. Because the defense counsel is able to pursue exami-
nation in whatever direction the court deems appropriate, the defen-
dant's right to cross-examine the victim-witness is not violated. 
C. Demeanor 
The Supreme Court has also deemed it important that the 
factfinder view the witness' demeanor.99 In California v. Green, for 
example, the Court suggested that viewing the witness aids "the jury 
cross-examination then afforded provides substantial compliance with the purposes behind 
the confrontation requirement, as long as the declarant's inability to give live testimony is in 
no way the fault of the state. 
399 U.S. at 166. 
95. In Jolly v. State, 681 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. 1984), the court admitted a videotaped statement 
of the six-year-old witness over the defendant's cross-examination objections. The court noted 
that the "trial court has broad discretionary powers regarding admissibility of recordings." 681 
S.W.2d at 696. See also Alexander v. State, 692 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1985) (court ruled against 
defendant's objections that the admission of videotape into evidence denied him the right to 
"effective and contemporaneous cross-examination" of the witness and thus denied him confron-
tation right); Tolbert v. State, 697 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. 1985) (intermediate appellate court ruled 
that the sixth amendment does not require that defendant be provided an opportunity to conduct 
cross-examination simultaneously with the taking of the child's videotaped statement); State v. 
Rogers, 692 P.2d 2 (Mont. 1984) (Montana Supreme Court dismissed the defendant's objections, 
characterizing videotape of child witness interview as the "best evidence" of a transcript of the 
interview already admitted into evidence); State v. Reid, 114 Ariz. 16, 559 P.2d 136 (1976) (vid-
eotaped testimony is less offensive to the defendant's right of confrontation than testimony from 
a preliminary hearing), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 921 (1977); State v. Melendez, 135 Ariz. 390, 392, 
661 P.2d 654, 656 (1983) (where a six-year-old victim would have become uncommunicative if 
called to testify, the court ruled that videotape procedure "can, when properly used, satisfy the 
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment"). But see Herbert v. Super. Ct., 117 Cal. App. 3d 
661, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1981), where the court found that "the right [of confrontation] is not 
limited to the trial stage of criminal proceedings, but extends to any phase in which witnesses are 
called for questioning." 117 Cal. App. 3d at 661, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 850. 
96. 197 N.J. Super. at 435, 484 A.2d at 1344. 
97. See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text. 
98. See section I.C. supra. See also Note, supra note 65, at 141. 
99. See Green, 399 U.S. at 158; Barberv. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 721, 725 (1968); Herbert, 117 
Cal. App. 3d at 665, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 855. See generally FED. R. Evm. 801 advisory commit· 
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in assessing his credibility. " 100 Yet, while demeanor evidence is im-
portant, the Court in Green indicated that a defendant's confrontation 
rights are not necessarily violated if some demeanor evidence is "for-
ever lost" to the jury.101 
Additionally, the presentation of videotaped testimony easily al-
lows the factfinder to see the demeanor of the witness. In fact, this is 
the element of confrontation best met by videotaped testimony. Sev-
eral state and federal courts have found that videotaped evidence cap-
tures enough demeanor to satisfy the requirements of the 
confrontation clause. For example, in People v. Moran 102 the court 
ruled that the process of presenting preliminary hearing testimony by 
videotape "does not significantly affect the flow of information to the 
jury," thus the videotape satisfied the "broad purposes" of the con-
frontation clause.103 Accordingly, the Moran court ruled that video-
tapes were a fair and reliable medium for the presentation of evidence 
at trial. 104 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also recognized the 
impact of videotaped testimony when it reversed the conviction of an 
alleged child molester because the replaying of a videotape during jury 
deliberation placed prejudicial emphasis on the complaining witness' 
testimony. Judge Skopil, writing for the court, argued that: 
Videotaped testimony is unique. It enables the jury to observe the de-
meanor and to hear the testimony of the witness. It serves as the func-
tional equivalent of a live witness. . . . 
Permitting the replay of the videotaped testimony in the jury room 
during deliberation was equivalent to allowing a live witness to testify a 
tee's introductory note; J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED, §§ 18:7-:18 (2d 
ed. 1986); Read, The New Confrontation-Hearsay Dilemma, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1972). 
100. 399 U.S. at 158. In Herbert, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 671, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 863, the court 
noted the corollary benefit of requiring face-to-face confrontation was that the jury could watch 
the witness testify. Professor Wigmore explains that a witness should testify in the presence of 
the fact finder because "the judge and the jury are enabled to obtain the elusive and incommuni-
cable evidence of a witness' deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is 
produced upon the witness." 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 92, at § 1395 (emphasis in original). 
101. 399 U.S. at 160. Wigmore explains that the advantage of seeing the witness testify is not 
regarded as essential, le., it may be dispensed with when not feasible. S J. WIGMORE, supra note 
92, at § 1395. 
102. 39 Cal. App. 3d 398, 114 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1974). 
103. 39 Cal. App. 3d at 410-11, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 420. 
104. The court explained: "[T]he advantages and disadvantages of the 'filtering' effect of the 
medium fall equally on both sides. Therefore, its use is 'fair' and there is no inherent unfair-
ness . . . . Video tape is sufficiently similar to live testimony to permit the jury to properly 
perform its function." 39 Cal. App. 3d at 410, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 420. See also Kansas City v. 
McCoy, 525 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1975) (closed-circuit television arrangement did not significantly 
affeet the defendant's ability to question and the jury's opportunity to observe the witness); State 
v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (1984) (videotape will present adequate de-
meanor evidence). See generally Bermant, Chappell, Crockett, Jacoubovitch & McGuire, Juror 
Responses to Prerecorded Videotape Trial Presentations in California and Ohio, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 
975 (1975). 
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second time in the jury room. 105 
The majority noted that replaying the videotape in the jury room was 
not analogous to replaying an audiotape because the ability to see the 
witness was particularly prejudicial.106 The court thus recognized that 
the ability of the factfinder to view the demeanor of the witness is not 
curtailed by using videotapes to present the child witness' testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
The elements of confrontation - face-to-face meeting, cross-exam-
ination, and the opportunity of the factfinder to view the demeanor of 
the witness - are geared toward the two goals of ensuring reliable 
testimony and preventing anonymous trials. These elements should be 
satisfied in the usual case. However, when a child is the victim of, or 
the witness to, a traumatizing event, references to the "usual case" no 
longer apply. 
Psychological literature, coupled with the empirical work under-
taken by the authors, indicate that videotaped testimony of children 
best serves children and the judicial process. Children who must con-
front the accused in court are prone to give less accurate testimony or 
no testimony at all because of their trauma. The videotaping proce-
dures suggested for taking a child's testimony minimize her psycho-
logical trauma and concurrently maximize the completeness and the 
accuracy of her testimony. These procedures also afford the defendant 
the opportunity to test the veracity of the witness, while permitting the 
factfinder to view the witness' demeanor. Although face-to-face meet-
ing is forfeited, so is the intimidation that is inherent in such a meet-
ing. By using videotapes, both children and society benefit, and the 
defendant is afforded a fair trial. 107 
- Paula E. and Samuel M. Hill 
105. United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 600, 601 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985). Federal appellate 
court decisions concerning the use of videotapes to present child testimony are rare. 
106. 769 F.2d at 601, n.l. The replaying of audiotapes for the jury has been permitted by the 
Ninth Circuit. See United States v. Puchi, 441 F.2d 697, 702 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 
853 (1971); see also United States v. Sims, 719 F.2d 375, 379 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 
U.S. 1304 (1984). 
107. Whitcomb, Shapiro and Stellwagen explain that attempts to make the child more com-
fortable, either physically or psychologically, can only serve to facilitate due process and a fair 
trial. WHITCOMB, supra note 11, at 18-20. 
